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Preface 
 
We are pleased to be able to bring together in a single volume the excellent contributions 
presented at the conference on “The Future of Retail Banking in Europe: Competition and 
Regulatory Challenges” held at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels on 
the 10th of June 2009. The conference was jointly organized by the European Credit Research 
Institute (ECRI) and the Deutsche Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin). The event 
coincided with the 10
th anniversary of the founding of ECRI. 
The conference, which took place in the midst of the financial crisis, brought together financial 
market experts who focus their research on microeconomic policies aimed at fostering effective 
competition in the banking industry. While most of the debate about the crisis has dealt with the 
banking industry as a whole and the stabilisation policies introduced by governments, especially 
central banks, this volume draws attention to the microeconomic specifics of banking. By 
starting with the basics underlying financial markets, we acquire a better understanding of the 
many facets of business practices, which in turn allows us to identify possible market failures. 
The identified market failures serve as a starting point for the design of optimal policies in the 
arenas of competition policy and consumer protection. This is the classic approach taken by 
specialists in industrial organization, which has been widely accepted as the most appropriate 
method in this field.  
A more active role of competition authorities in the banking industry is a rather new 
phenomenon. Ironically, the massive bailouts, subsidies and guarantees provided by national 
governments put competition policy at risk, just before it really started to become effective. 
With regard to consumer protection as a prerequisite for effective competition in financial retail 
markets, research is still evolving. This research is increasingly taking into account the 
psychological foundations of consumer decision-making – a promising perspective for better 
policy formulation in the future. In this area, policy-makers have just started to take policy 
advice (based on microeconomic analysis) more consistently into account.  
Professor Georges Siotis, a member of the Chief Economist Team at DG Competition at the 
European Commission, listed in his contribution “EU Competition Policy in Times of Financial 
Crisis” the various measures adopted by DG Competition to assure a pro-competitive use of 
state-aid. His paper also deals with the European Commission’s recent decisions in individual 
cases, which show that a staggering amount of capital has been injected into financial markets 
by means of guarantees, recapitalisations and other liquidity measures. Overall, the 
Commission’s banking communications should have helped to supervise state-aid programmes 
to avoid outright misuse. However, as exemplified by the “restructuring communication” of DG 
Competition, there is still much to do when it comes to the supervision and monitoring of 
restructuring measures. 
The challenging situation facing European competition policy in the current financial crisis also 
lies at the core of the paper “Competition Policy in Retail Banking – Before and After the 
Crisis” by Professor Giancarlo Spagnolo (Universita di Roma “Tor Vegata” and Stockholm 
Institute of Transition Economics). Just before the crisis, competition policy had received a lot 
of attention among policy-makers at conferences organised by various international institutions 
and in inquires carried out by competition authorities into practices in the banking sector. With 2 | PREFACE 
the financial turmoil, a more sceptical view about the alleged trade-off between competition and 
stability regained grounds. His paper summarizes the theoretical and empirical research on that 
topic. Unfortunately, empirical studies suffer from limited data so that an identifiable and robust 
relationship between competition policy and financial stability has not yet been established. 
Moreover, virtually all empirical research suffers from the fact that it works with time periods in 
which a financial downturn like the current one was not an issue. To the contrary, financial 
markets were healthy and growing so that the critical impact of competition policy within a 
period of financial instability and thereafter is completely absent in the data. Professor Spagnolo 
also criticises recent retail banking inquiries for not paying sufficient attention to the involved 
risks, which should be at the core of any competition analysis in banking. His contribution, 
therefore, emphasizes the need to collect new and richer data sets, which should then be 
properly analyzed by competition authorities. He also presents his own view on recent debates 
about the question whether competition policy altogether can be regarded as a driver of growth 
and social welfare. He forcefully argues in favour of a significant positive effect of a well-
designed competition environment on overall prosperity.  
Professor Hans Degryse (CentER/Tilburg University and CESIfo) presents a review of the latest 
developments in the empirical analysis of banking and financial markets. In his paper entitled 
“The Financial Crisis and Competition in Retail Banking: Insights from the Academic 
Literature” (co-authored with Steven Ongena, CentER/Tilburg University and CEPR), he 
presents several studies that show that competition impacts negatively on banks’ profits and 
loan rates. However, those relationships appear to be less robust when compared with other 
industries. The empirical analysis of the relationship between competition and stability still 
suffers from a proper account of the endogeneity problems. There is, however, evidence 
indicating that banks’ lending standards deteriorate during boom – a fact that appears to become 
stronger when competition increases. Professor Degryse puts those findings into the context of 
the diversity of national regulatory regimes and government interventions which may induce 
spurious regression results. Pointing to the growing governmental engagement and involvement 
of politicians in the course of the current crisis, he emphasizes the danger that poorly managed 
banks may become the cause of the next crisis, and this topic therefore should receive special 
attention. Finally, the contribution also uncovers several open fields for a pro-active consumer 
policy, for example the reduction of consumer switching costs and enhancing the transparency 
of retail financial products or, more generally, improving the financial literacy of consumers. 
Professor Roman Inderst (Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt) describes the 
economic principles of consumer protection policy in general and applies those principles, in his 
contribution “Retail Finance: Rethinking Regulation and Consumer Protection in the Wake of 
the Financial Crisis”, to the design of consumer protection regulations that should govern the 
markets for retail financial products. The financial crisis was triggered by a crisis in the markets 
for mortgages and mortgage-related products. Professor Inderst argues that a proper consumer 
policy in retail finance should not only impact positively on competition, but should also foster 
overall financial stability. However, research is still evolving in that field and there remain 
many open questions. Policy advice is often not straightforward as financial markets are 
complex and several trade-offs arise when a certain policy is at stake. For example, regulations 
that draw attention to the inherent conflicts of interests between financial advisors and 
customers (created, for example, by commissions) can reduce mis-selling incentives on the one 
hand, but may also undermine an advisor’s motivation to serve his customer optimally. At a 
more general level, Professor Inderst argues that consumer protection policies should mainly 
counter misconduct on the part of firms, allowing the competitive forces of the markets to 
develop to the benefit of consumers.  
Lastly, Damien Gerard (Research Fellow, Chair of European Law, University of Louvain) 
focused his contribution “Between Competition and Regulation: The Conditionality of Bailout THE FUTURE OF RETAIL BANKING IN EUROPE: COMPETITION AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES | 3 
Plans” on the pros and cons of requirements dictated by bailout plans. To prevent distortions in 
markets, the Commission has conditioned the authorization of state-aids on various 
requirements, including behavioural constraints (such as, for example, limitations on 
advertisements) and structural measures (in particular business restrictions and pull-out of 
activities). Moral hazard issues have been addressed, for instance by means of limitations on the 
distribution of dividends and on remunerations or severance packages for managers. Overall, 
there is a lot of variation across Europe and a harmonized approach is still missing. He comes to 
a rather critical assessment of structural measures, which may frustrate incentives within banks. 
In addition, a re-focus on banks’ national core business may also create tensions with the 
objective to strengthen the internal market in the EU. 
Much remains open for future research in the areas of competition in banking, financial crisis 
and consumer protection. With this volume of selected papers, we hope to contribute to a better 
understanding of these critical interactions.  
Nicola Jentzsch and Christian Wey 
Berlin  
4 | 
EU Competition Policy in Times of Financial Crisis 
Professor Georges Siotis, Chief Economist Team, DG Competition, 
European Commission* 
 
The beginning of the crisis manifested itself as what initially appeared to be isolated cases of 
financial institutions that had pursued flawed business models (e.g. Northern Rock). At the time, 
it was believed that it would probably not go much further than these individual cases. The 
situation changed dramatically with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The 
fact that a bank like Lehman would not be bailed out and was to be allowed to collapse (or 
could not be saved from filing from bankruptcy) came as a real shock. This led to a complete 
gridlock in financial markets, which were said to have suffered a ‘heart attack’. Public 
authorities promptly reacted by providing support in order to keep the financial system 
functioning.  
The immediate consequence of this was that first to harmonise retail deposit insurance as a race 
to the top was gathering pace. Indeed, large flows of deposit money travelled across borders 
chasing the highest insurance. Since then, there has been a much larger degree of uniformity 
across member states. Second, the Commission invoked Article 87 (3) (b). The latter allows for 
state aid to correct for a ‘serious disturbance’ that affects the entire economy of a member state. 
As you may know, article 87 2 (b) had only been invoked in the case of Greece during the 1980s.  
87 3 (b) puts state aid on a different footing as it allows for state aid to correct a macro 
disturbance to the economy. DG Competition had to adapt to this new setting, particularly with 
respect to rescue and restructuring aid. It also allowed some member states to adopt broad, 
economic-wide schemes that covered the entire economy.  
Ex post, it proved to be part of an adequate response. As you well know, DG COMP was soon 
faced by a ‘tsunami’ of state aid cases in the financial sector. Often, the problem was worse than 
initially expected.  
Despite these exceptional circumstances, the basic principles have not changed. State aid is a 
balancing exercise. It is explicitly recognised that, most of the time, State aid it does lead to a 
distortion of competition. At the same time, there is a recognition that markets are not always 
efficient. Some markets are characterised by pervasive market failures, and state aid can 
contribute to correct these market failures. The approach consists of carrying out a balancing 
test: distortion of competition vs. correction of market failures. Hopefully the outcome is 
positive in terms of welfare.  
What type of market failures emerge in the context of a financial crisis? First, systemic risk can 
lead to large negative externalities. The market failure stems from the fact that the social cost 
associated with the bankruptcy of one financial institution is potentially much larger than the 
private cost to shareholders, creditors, and managers of the failed institution. This is a clear, 
basic market failure and it is therefore desirable to have public authorities intervene. The second 
is that when confidence disappears, massive coordination problems arise. Third, the presence of 
asymmetric information can lead to a breakdown of securitisation markets.
1 Fourth, risk was 
mispriced before the crisis and possibly also during the crisis. 
                                                      
* The author underlines that his contribution was made in an individual capacity and cannot be attributed 
to the European Commission or DG Competition. 
1 This securitisation market breakdown is analogous to the second-hand car market breakdown example 
of Akerlof (1970), in which potential buyers are assumed to possess less information than the car dealer THE FUTURE OF RETAIL BANKING IN EUROPE: COMPETITION AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES | 5 
Having a justification for state aid does not mean that the problems linked to state aid disappear. 
They do not. Even though state support may contribute to financial stability in the short term, 
there is a latent tension between short-term financial stability and medium-term competition. 
Indeed, public intervention in the financial sector can lead to serious distortions of competition 
in the medium term. For the recipient, the issue of moral hazard is central. Moral hazard has 
become a popular word and is sometimes used in an imprecise way, but it is important to 
understand that it is not about what happened in the past, but what will happen in the future. 
Bailouts can create moral hazard, which will affect the behaviour of agents in the future. 
Therefore, we have to be very careful not to create the conditions that will trigger the next crisis 
down the line.  
Moral hazard is a central theme and the distortion is not only limited to the recipient of state aid, 
but also affects the incentives of competitors. In the presence of bailouts by the State, 
competitors of the assisted entity observe that it is not the markets that allocate rents and profits, 
but it is the State that does so in an ex-post manner. This can lead to distortions; both in the 
product and input markets. If banks or financial institutions expect repeat intervention, which 
will affect perceived marginal cost and therefore pricing and this in turn leads to a distortion in 
the product market. It can also create distortion in the input market, e.g. via easier of access to 
funding.  
Another problem – at least at the European Commission – is that some large banks compete 
across different national jurisdictions. Member states are the ones that provide bailout funds and 
are primarily concerned about developments in their jurisdiction; often they do not internalise 
the consequences of their actions on other jurisdictions. Member States also differ in terms of 
their ability and willingness to intervene. This has the potential to distort competition.  
What has the Commission, and in particular DG COMP, done? It has provided both ex-ante 
guidance and has had to deal with specific cases of financial institutions that only survived the 
storm because of generous public support. Regarding ex-ante guidance, there was a first 
Communication  in October 2008, fairly general, establishing general principles of non-
discrimination, level playing field, etc. One important element is that it contains guidance on the 
price for guarantees based on the ECB’s recommendations.
2  
In December 2008, when member states were increasingly recapitalising their banks with large 
amounts, a second communication (the "recapitalisation communication") was adopted.
3 The 
latter introduces a distinction between fundamentally sound and fundamentally unsound banks. 
In practice, a fundamentally sound bank is a bank that experiences stress because of the 
systemic crisis, but would be perfectly viable under normal conditions. A fundamentally 
unsound bank is a financial institution that is experiencing difficulties not only because of the 
systemic crisis, but would also experience those difficulties under normal times. This is very 
convenient conceptually, but in practice it can be quite a challenge to decide where to draw the 
line. In principle, it is done on the basis of ex-ante indicators; still, the decision on how to 
                                                                                                                                                            
and are only willing to bid at most the average price between a good car and a bad car (‘a lemon’). A 
similar mechanism may have played a role in the drying up of the market for all but the most simple types 
of securitisation. 
2 Commission Communication on “The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to 
financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis” (Official Journal C 270, 
25/10/2008, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:270:0008:0014:EN:PDF). 
3 Commission Communication on “The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial 
crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of 
competition” (Official Journal C 10, 15/01/2009, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
OJ:C:2009:010:0002:0010:EN:PDF). 6 | EU COMPETITION POLICY IN TIMES OF FINANCIAL CRISIS  
categorise a bank is not always clear-cut. The recapitalisation communication also gives 
guidance on the pricing of the recapitalisation according to the profile of the banks.  
Following developments at the end of 2008, the Commission adopted a third communication on 
impaired assets in February 2009.
4 Indeed, it rapidly became clear that impaired assets would be 
the next problem. It was quickly realised that the presence of toxic assets on balance sheets was 
not a problem limited to a few banks and of limited magnitude, but rather a much more 
widespread problem across Europe's banking sector.  
The so-called ‘restructuring Communication’ explains how the Commission is applying the 
rescue and restructuring guidelines to the specifics of the financial industry.
5  
Another initiative that is worth mentioning regards pan-European stress testing. The added 
value of such an exercise would be the application of uniform criteria across jurisdictions. This 
exercise will be coordinated by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS).  
In terms of individual cases, there are 57 decisions without counting amendments to several 
decisions, a fairly large number: 32 individual measures affecting 26 different institutions – 
some of them are large, so these are relevant magnitudes – and 24 schemes adopted by member 
states for the entire financial sector.
6  
And there are still some ongoing investigations, e.g. Northern Rock. Most cases involve banks 
from more advanced countries, at least from a financial perspective. A number of institutions 
have required support on various occasions, meaning that the first intervention did not prove to 
be enough.  
In terms of schemes, the Commission approved government guarantee schemes for newly 
issued debt, recapitalisation schemes (with some schemes involving both types of intervention), 
as well as support aimed at facilitating access to liquidity.  
In terms of implementation, here are some numbers that I was initially very reluctant to use, 
because they are provisional. They are based on information given by member states, so caution 
should be applied, and they are just an order of magnitude. The table below distinguishes 
between commitments (i.e., the amounts that could be paid) versus actual disbursements. The 
numbers are quite staggering.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
4 Commission Communication “On the Treatment of Impaired Assets in the Community Banking Sector” 
(Official Journal C 72, 26/03/2009, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
OJ:C:2009:072:0001:0022:EN:PDF); Commission Communication on “The return to viability and the 
assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules” 
(Official Journal C195, 19/08/2009, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
OJ:C:2009:195:0009:0020:EN:PDF). 
5 Commission Communication on “The return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in 
the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules” (Official Journal C195, 19/08/2009, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:195:0009:0020:EN:PDF). 
6 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result THE FUTURE OF RETAIL BANKING IN EUROPE: COMPETITION AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES | 7 
Table 1. EU public interventions in the banking sector 
  Capital injections  Liability guarantees Asset  relief  TOTAL 
  Committe
d  Effective  Committe
d  Effective  Committe
d  Effective 
Total 
committe
d 
Total 
effective 
EA (€bn)  241  156 1.849 725  103  89  2.193 969 
EA (% GDP)  3% 2%  21%  8% 1% 1%  24%  11% 
EU  (€bn)  315  202 2.913 937  103  89  3.331  1.228 
EU (% GDP)  3%  2%  25%  8%  1%  1%  28%  10% 
Source: EC Services (Cutoff date 31 August 2009). 
In terms of take-ups, the numbers for guarantee schemes were initially very low, around 10-15%, 
while they accelerated fast over the past few weeks, so now it is at about 32% of the total that 
had been made available. The take-up of recapitalisation funds has been higher, but it also 
increased over the past few weeks: it used to stand at 50%, while its current figure is about 55%.  
These schemes were adopted over a short period of time. They are certainly not flawless, and 
there are many issues that are on the table. For this reason, the schemes can be adapted along the 
way. Just to mention a few issues: what is the incentive for banks to participate when these 
schemes are not mandatory? Some of them include caps on remuneration. Is this desirable?  
Depending on the sovereign rating of their country of origin and their exposure to toxic assets, 
two banks with the same rating can end up paying prices for recapitalisation funds or guarantees 
on newly issued debt. This is a cause for concern in terms of level-playing field. In addition, the 
schemes are in place for a limited duration. Given that refinancing needs are huge, the question 
arises as to whether banks will have the ability to access sufficient funds in the absence of 
government support. 
Given the size of the problem, one may wonder whether we should not have a specific regime to 
deal with banks in distress. At the time when Lehman Brothers collapsed, member states did not 
have special resolution regimes (SRR) involving prompt corrective action (PCA) for financial 
institutions. Since then, some member states have adopted legislation, but these new tools have 
barely been used. 
It is an important issue to see whether it would be desirable to have a more widespread use SRR 
cum PCA. The idea being that – properly implemented – SRR/PCA would avoid the painful 
choice between a taxpayer financed bailout and bankruptcy of the Lehman-type with its 
associated shock-waves. 
DG COMP has to approve the restructuring plans that unsound banks having received support 
have to present, no later than six months after having received the aid. This ex-post intervention 
in the form of restructuring plans could potentially be used to address some of the problems that 
are behind the current situation and include features that are similar to the special resolution 
regimes, for example on how to deal with moral hazard.  
These restructuring plans are based on three pillars: (a) own contribution or burden-sharing, (b) 
compensatory measures and (c) ensuring long-term viability (which is the most important of the 
three pillars).  
Own contribution means that the company should make a contribution so that state aid is limited 
to the minimum necessary and such that moral hazard is being minimised. This implies that 
owners, creditors, managers should share the cost of the rescue. In the case of financial entities, 
that could potentially involve the conversion of hybrid capital into common equity, a feature 8 | EU COMPETITION POLICY IN TIMES OF FINANCIAL CRISIS  
that is common in special resolution regimes. This would mean restructuring the liability side of 
the balance sheet.  
So far, compensatory measures have fallen on the asset side of banks' balance sheets. The logic 
behind compensatory measures is that the aid allows the firm to survive, which harms 
competitors. Compensatory measures are there to ‘compensate’ competitors. For non-financial 
funds this typically involves reducing capacity and/or selling assets. In the financial sector, 
particularly in the context of a systemic crisis, it is a little more complicated. The disappearance 
of one entity may actually not benefit competitors, but harm them, as they are often creditors of 
the failed institutions. In addition, if, during a systemic crisis, many firms have to sell assets, a 
potentially serious problem could arise: too many sellers and very few buyers.  
It is clear that restructuring plans have to be tailored to the specifics of each situation, taking 
into account the nature of the financial system and the fact that we experienced a crisis of 
systemic dimensions. Last, there is a real risk that this crisis may reinforce the home country 
bias; thus fragmenting the internal market – something that we should not be happy about, at 
least not at the Commission.  
As mentioned above, long-term viability is a central pillar. The objective is to ensure that the 
restructuring plan will create an entity that will be able to stand on its own in the medium- to 
long-term; that is, without explicit state support.  
DG COMP's activity has to be viewed in the context of an uncertain environment. The 
regulatory system is changing, albeit slowly. The restructuring plans have to take this evolution 
into account as well as the fact that business models are changing in the banking industry.  
An important question regards timing. So far, bail-outs have been carried out ‘over the 
weekend’, while restructuring plans have come six months later. It is possible to wonder 
whether the bail-out and the restructuring plans should not be simultaneous, or at least be 
devised closer in time. 
This crisis should not become a missed opportunity. As has often been mentioned, a crisis can 
offer opportunities for beneficial change.  
We still have problems in the system. Lending is probably not going where it should. The real, 
one long-term issue is whether it will be possible to avoid the emergence of ‘zombie’ banks 
lending to ‘zombie’ borrowers.  
This is what happened in Japan and to a lesser extent in the US. ‘Zombie’ banks are those 
institutions that barely meet the regulatory requirements and as a consequence, do not expand or 
lend sufficiently. ‘Zombie’ borrowers still manage to have access to credit, as banks know that 
if they write these loans off, they will fail themselves. The existence of ‘zombie’ borrowers 
slows down adjustment, impedes entry and thereby can lead to a L-shaped recession with a slow, 
almost inexistent recovery for years.  
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Competition Policy in Retail Banking: 
Before and after the crisis  
Professor Giancarlo Spagnolo, Università di Roma “Tor Vergata”, SITE - 
Stockholm School of Economics, EIEF and CEPR 
 
This paper looks at the implications of the global financial crisis for competition policy in the 
banking sector. Before this crisis – unfortunately just before the crisis – there was greatly 
increased attention on the need for competition and the enforcement of competition policy in the 
banking sector, in particular in the retail banking sector. For instance, the OECD held a policy 
roundtable and the EU DG Competition and several national European competition authorities 
undertook a number of sector inquiries on retail banking.
7 During the same period – the two or 
three years before the crisis – the network of international competition authorities openly called 
for the elimination of any special rule for competition enforcement in retail banking.  
The sector inquiries identified a number of competitive problems, such as high switching costs 
for small customers, both transactional and informational, the lack of consumer ability to 
compare products, regulatory barriers to entry, inappropriate institutional information-sharing, 
too many ‘dangerous relations’ (too much cooperation) amongst competitors in payment 
networks, and so on. Hans Degryse will cover these issues in his chapter; what is important to 
note is that all this happened just before the crisis. 
Then the crisis struck, starting as a US financial crisis and then becoming a global financial and 
economic crisis. History tells us that in exceptional situations like deep economic crisis or war, 
competition concerns are typically put on the back-burner. The immediate concerns shift 
towards issues such as the ‘preservation’ of productive and financial capabilities. Recent studies 
have shown, however, that this kind of soft competition policy tends to have a negative effect on 
the speed with which the economy recovers. A paper by Cole and Ohanian (2004) shows, for 
example, that the cartelisation policy allowed during the New Deal, with the aim of increasing 
wages and spending by limiting competition, actually delayed the exit from the Great 
Depression considerably. Lax competition policy does not seem to be an appropriate instrument 
with which to fight global downturns.  
Still, the temptation to downplay or postpone competition concerns has been and still is high 
nowadays for those governments in search of public support, as the consumer is not as 
politically organised as the business sector. Strong forces have instead been pushing for more 
and more state aid – in various forms – to failing banks. State aid intervention during a financial 
crisis is, however, typically subject to severe time constraints as its aim is to prevent panic on 
the side of depositors, and sound bank failures due to lack of trust and liquidity in the interbank 
market. Such policies therefore need to be reviewed by the competent authorities within a very 
short time frame, a few days typically, to be effective in one sense or another. This of course 
considerably reduces the ‘quality’ of the state aid policy, for example its ability to select the 
right cases for intervention; those that really deserve public support and rescue. 
The banking industry has always been considered a ‘special’ industry, in terms of the 
competition and stability trade-off it may entail and for the public goods the banking network 
provides. When it is widely considered more important to save the banking sector than to let 
banks compete, it is normal that policies like public subsidies and nationalisation are rapidly and 
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extensively implemented. At such times of crisis, however, mergers, often directly arranged by 
regulators and subsidised with taxpayers’ money, have also often been used as an instrument to 
‘save’ failing financial institutions with likely ‘systemic relevance’. This took place without 
much attention being given to their likely negative long-run consequences, in both anti-
competitive and financial stability terms.  
Theory tells us that very large banks, for example those that originated in the intense bank 
merger wave that before the crisis, tend to substantially reduce both their participation in the 
interbank market and the amount of liquid reserves they hold us a buffer. Carletti, Hartmann and 
Spagnolo (2007) produced the only theoretical study of bank merger and liquidity I am aware of, 
and show that these effects may interact and worsen systemic liquidity shortages. Hence, 
according to this theory, mergers creating very large banks may be the source of liquidity 
shortages and ultimately the next financial crisis. Recent empirical evidence is consistent with 
this theory, as it finds that large merging banks tend to significantly reduce the amount of liquid 
reserves they hold to buffer liquidity shocks or to be lent on the interbank market after the 
merger.
8 This means that the use of mega-mergers to save large failing banks during this crisis 
will make the situation worse, and may turn out to be one of the main causes of the next 
financial crisis.  
Note that this argument is independent from – and adds to the other important argument – that 
too large financial institutions are prone to moral hazard and risk-taking because they are aware 
of being Too Big Too Fail (TBTF), and therefore are sure of being rescued by the tax-payer in 
one way or another if things go wrong (but cash in the entire benefits in bonuses if they don’t).  
Note also that nationalised banks can be re-privatised in good times, with no bad effects on 
long-term bank competition and even possibly net gains for the tax-payer. Subsidies can be paid 
back at a penalty rate. But it will be costly and politically difficult – though clearly necessary – 
to break up these gigantic new financial institutions into a sufficiently large number of smaller 
ones so that they will not be considered TBTF and induce the next financial crisis. Breaking up 
mega-banks is also obviously needed from a competition policy point of view, given that scale 
economies are exhausted at a rather low bank size and that standard compatibility concerns, 
which in part prevented competition authorities from breaking down Microsoft, are entirely 
absent. 
What about the role of competition in this crisis? First of all, we do not yet fully understand 
what happened. People are not saying openly that excessive competition among banks was 
among the causes of the financial crisis. However, people are saying that the problem arose out 
of excessive risk-taking; most likely induced by unfettered competition, as well as poorly 
regulated and poorly supervised financial innovation. We still do not know what exactly caused 
the most damage in the lead-up to such a great global downturn – we will perhaps know more 
after some years of research (many economists are still studying to try understand the Great 
Depression in depth...). 
As mentioned above, it was an unfortunate coincidence that competition policy was applied 
more and more to the banking sector just before the crisis. Central Banks, for example, lost 
substantial authority on competition policy in banking to the advantage of the more focused 
Competition Authorities in the two decades before the crisis. Many other changes took place at 
the same time, of course. In particular, financial regulation was considerably relaxed in the US 
and the Fed’s monetary policy was very lax for a very long time, but still... 
So what do we expect for competition policy in retail banking in the coming future, apart from 
the daunting tasks it will face, i.e. re-establishing some public confidence in competitive 
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markets and breaking down TBTF monopolistic mega-banks? Of course, we expect strong and 
recurrent attacks, from many banks, associations and even regulators and central banks.
9 The 
question is then: do we have robust enough evidence to counter these attacks? Governments 
should be able to say that they cannot downplay competition policy enforcement in banking 
because this policy substantially increases overall welfare; it produces benefits widely in excess 
of its costs plus the possible costs it may impose on any industry participant. It is important to 
have this kind of instrument to counter such attacks.  
If we start to think about what we know about the effects of competition policy on society in 
general, we are immediately led to the debate in the US, which was started by the very 
provocative study by Crandall and Winston (2003). This study claimed that competition policy, 
as enforced in the US, has been ineffective, if not counterproductive. It was clearly a somewhat 
biased study, but it still had informational content and it was the study that first raised the issue. 
A debate followed in which Baker (2003), Werden (2003) and many others disagreed, both on 
the methodology and on the substance of that study. In the end, looking also at Whinston’s 
(2006) book, there does not seem to be much hard evidence on the substantial positive welfare 
effects of competition policy, either in general or in specific sectors. 
Following an initiative of DG ECFIN, in Buccirossi et al. (2009) we have tried to find more 
direct evidence of the effects of competition policy on society. In particular, the aim of that 
study was to investigate a possible direct link between the quality of competition policy and 
countries’ productivity growth. We collected data from many sources and built detailed 
indicators on the many components determining the quality of competition policy for 13 
jurisdictions, with the help of DG Competition. We then developed summary statistical 
indicators at different levels of aggregation. We thereby produced a set of indicators that closely 
track the evolution of the quality of competition policy enforcement in these jurisdictions for a 
decade (1995-2005), which we then used to estimate the effect of competition policy on 
productivity growth. There is of course always a problem of causality in econometrics, and we 
do not have a natural experiment, but the long panel we built was helpful, as were a number of 
good instruments. We found robust evidence that a high quality of competition policy induces a 
significant and robust positive effect on productivity growth. Competition policy seems to be 
effective overall in enhancing productivity and growth; the origins of the wealth of nations. 
Competition authorities could nonetheless do more to help in this direction. Collecting the data 
necessary for the paper was a rather daunting task, because most competition authorities do not 
keep adequate records of their own activities. Some competition authorities did not even allow 
us access to the scant data they had collected. Collecting records appropriately and making them 
accessible to researchers, as most Central Banks do, increases the accountability and 
transparency of competition authorities and is an important means of making the case for 
competition policy. Attitudes clearly need to change here.  
Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that banking is somewhat special; it is an industry like no 
other. In banking, productivity concerns are not all that important from a public point of view, 
particularly when there are stability issues at stake. Even though competition authorities were 
arguing before the crisis that banking is an industry like any other, we know that there is a long 
tradition of seeing banking as ‘different’. This is due to the very high leverage of financial 
institutions and the associated high risk of moral hazard/risk-shifting, amplified by state 
guarantees like deposit insurance that are designed to prevent bank runs, together with the 
extreme interdependence between institutions and their propensity to losses of confidence and 
runs, leading to an intrinsic fragility and a high risk of contagion. Another aspect that makes 
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banking special is its provision of public goods: payment services, liquidity, screening of 
borrowers, etc.  
Banking is clearly a ‘special’ industry; this is why it is so highly regulated. But is there any 
industry that is not ‘special’? Agriculture is also special because of environment externalities; 
telecommunications because of its network effects and regulation; energy is also special, as it is 
strategically important. Certainly, we can say that banking is more special in the sense that 
people have been saying that it is special for longer. There is a ‘special speciality’ to banking, 
which we should take into account because people have the long-held perception that this is the 
case.  
The most important reason why many economists also believe that banking has special features 
is the competition/stability trade-off suggested by the charter value (or ‘franchise value’) theory 
of bank regulation (see e.g. Keely, 1990; Hellman et al., 2000). The story goes that if you let 
banks compete too much, so that the value of their charters – the expected future profits the 
charter allows to expect – is too low, then banks will start misbehaving by taking on too much 
risk, shifting the bad consequences on to others thanks to limited liability. This is because the 
‘stick’ that the prudential regulator can use to punish such moral hazard; taking the banking 
charter away from the banker, is too small.  
Other authors, like Broeker (1990), suggested that competition could reduce or eliminate banks’ 
incentives and ability to effectively screen borrowers, in particular when credit registers are 
absent or have limited coverage. This may happen because by screening banks impose a 
negative externality on each other, i.e. spoil their pool of borrowers, and because poor rejected 
applicants can apply to more and more banks when there are many competing, eventually 
finding one that makes a mistake in screening. These effects will be greater the larger the 
number of competing banks in the market.  
Because of these dominant views, until 15 or 20 years ago the banking industry was not subject 
to any serious competition policy check in any country, at least not to my knowledge. Central 
banks were mostly responsible for competition policy in banking, but did not really enforce it 
seriously because they considered stability as a priority and intense competition as one way of 
losing control over banks’ activities.  
Competition policy enforcement in the banking industry became more stringent in the last two 
decades. This followed or paralleled the development of ‘new views’ in academic literature 
suggesting that the trade-off between competition and stability may actually not be as robust as 
many people thought.  
Novel theories, like Boyd and De Nicolò (2005), showed that more competitive banking 
markets could be less risky than less competitive ones. This is because the interest rate on loans 
tends to be lower with competing banks; a lower interest rate tends to reduce moral hazard on 
the side of borrowers, and this in turn reduces the riskiness of the lending banks. The traditional 
view of a trade-off between competition and stability has also been questioned empirically, for 
example by Beck et al. (2005). The academic and policy debate, however, is still wide open.
10 
Apart from the academic debate, we know that competition policy in banking has been 
strengthened in recent years and we would like to know more about the effects of this 
strengthening to be able to counter future attacks. One study by Carletti, Ongena and Hartmann 
(2008) looks at banks’ stock price reaction when merger control is moved from the central bank 
to the competition authority and therefore becomes tighter from a competition policy point of 
view. Surprisingly, they find that the stock price of the banking sector experiences a significant 
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abnormal increase around the announcement of this institutional change. That is, the stock 
market reacts positively in terms of expected banks’ future earnings when the competition 
control is transferred from the central banks to competition authorities.  
Normally, one would expect the opposite, that is; a negative stock price reaction, since stricter 
competition policy enforcement should in principle reduce banks’ expected future 
anticompetitive rents. In fact, they find negative effects for other sectors than banks, but a robust 
positive effect for banks. My favourite interpretation of this surprising empirical finding is that 
when you have two regulators with partially overlapping competences, they must often ‘fight’ 
openly on decisions – like advocates – and this debate forces more informed, transparent and 
efficient policy decision-making that may induce a more intense future growth of the industry. 
In a related study, Carletti, Ongena and Spagnolo (2010), we look at individual mergers, and in 
particular at how the above-mentioned changes in the organisation of merger control in banking 
affects the value of the individual merging banks. We analyse the abnormal returns in the stock 
market price around the critical dates of each merger, before and after the institutional changes 
in bank merger control. We then try to understand the role of the status of the bank in that 
merger (acquirer or target), the type of merger (national or cross-border); and whether there is a 
strong legal supervisory structure. We also look at how the institutional changes affect the total 
abnormal returns of bank mergers. 
Preliminary results suggest that since the authority on bank merger control was shifted in favour 
of competition authorities, the distribution of abnormal returns changed in favour of the target 
banks of the merger and away from the acquirer. This change appears consistent with an 
increase in competition in the market for banks’ corporate control; i.e. that bidding competition 
at the take-over stage got tougher, thereby increasing the returns for the target and reducing the 
returns for the acquirer. Another preliminary finding is that total abnormal returns for the 
merging banks together appear reduced by the change in the institutional organisation of bank 
merger control. A tentative interpretation of this finding is that it suggests that allocating bank 
merger control to competition authorities instead of central banks deterred anti-competitive 
mergers and selected more competitive ones. This interpretation is in part supported by the fact 
that this effect is not present for cross-border mergers, which are typically not considered anti-
competitive because the merging banks are active on different markets. This is more good news 
that could also be used to counter attacks on competition policy in banking. 
Concerns were also raised in the inquiries of DG Competition and others about insufficient 
information-sharing across banks and about market fragmentation and the inability to enter 
other markets for adverse selection reasons. In a study by Giannetti et al. (2010) – partly funded 
by ECRI – we find that after public registers are introduced, the type of entry shifts in favour of 
branching rather than mergers, and if no public register is introduced, banks tend to enter more 
through M&As. With a merger, the acquirer buys a local bank and therefore also its information 
base. However, branches are very important for retail competition, so more information-sharing 
should favour more entry through branching and less entry through M&As. This suggests that 
competition policy could focus more on information-sharing, as this seems to be a good way to 
increase competition through branches, which is what we want for retail banking.  
Finally, the future of competition policy in banking is also likely to depend on how competition 
policy is run. As mentioned above, many sector inquiries on retail banking were performed by 
competition authorities before the crisis. In Caiazza et al. (2008) we reviewed all these retail 
inquiries and one aspect is rather striking: there is no strong focus on – and in some of them no 
consideration at all – risk. When considering financial products, interest rates are prices but 
what is the quality dimension? The main quality dimension of financial products is their risk-
element. If you compare prices, also across markets, without appropriately weighting for the 
different risk of the financial contracts, you are missing the point completely. If one security or THE FUTURE OF RETAIL BANKING IN EUROPE: COMPETITION AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES | 15 
loan in a market has a high risk and therefore a high price that correctly incorporates a risk 
premium, and another loan in another market has a slightly lower price but a much lower risk, 
one should not only compare prices and conclude that the first market is probably less 
competitive than the second because prices are higher. If risk is fully taken into account, one 
would correctly reach the opposite conclusion.  
There is a tendency in competition authorities to use ‘standard methods’ from basic competition 
analysis in all industries. However, we know well that these simple methods may not be 
applicable to many situations, for example to complex public procurements, or two-sided 
markets with network effects, one has to adapt and develop the standard methodologies to more 
complex environments than the standard beer market, or one will make incorrect judgments. In 
banking, the degree and structure of risk is the main quality dimension and all measures should 
be weighted for the different degree of risk. This does not seem to be done appropriately by 
most competition authorities, at least not in the sector inquiries that have come to our attention. 
One more thing that competition authorities may want to do in the future to be able to counter 
the attacks that will likely come, is to be a bit more precise and specific in the way they deal 
with competition in the banking industry, although admittedly this will not be an easy task.  
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The Financial Crisis and Competition in Retail Banking: 
Insights from the academic literature 
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1. Introductory  remarks 
The interdependence between the current financial crisis and competition in retail banking in 
general is the focus of this paper. In particular, we aim to provide insights from recent academic 
literature on this interdependence, although of course research related to the crisis is ongoing. 
This paper is partly based upon previous work, the OECD competition background paper,
11 
which was written before the crisis
12 and a recent book
13 that we have co-authored with Moshe 
Kim on several of these issues. 
We first look at the phenomena of finance and growth, then the methods to measure competition 
in banking and the possible peculiarities for banking. We then look briefly at competition, 
stability and lending standards, and the regulation of competition. We will also consider the 
topic of switching costs (transactional and informational) and policy measures to reduce 
switching costs. 
On the finance and growth nexus, Levine (2005)
14 shows that financial intermediation is an 
important determinant of economic growth. His work demonstrates that financial development 
in countries causes higher growth rates. Therefore, banks reduce problems that are inherent in 
imperfect capital markets. We also know that banks are very important and often exclusive 
financiers of small and medium sized companies (SMEs).  
One of the issues before the crisis was that – at least for retail banking markets – we often 
conclude that retail banking markets in Europe are not yet fully integrated. However, the 
evidence that we have up to now for the ‘finance and growth’ nexus mainly stems from growing 
and healthy economies, at least not from countries facing a recession. Considering the current 
financial crisis, an important open issue is: What banking and financial markets structure will 
allow us to come out of the financial crisis relatively quickly? We believe that so far there is no 
good answer to this question, because the identification of financial structure and growth has 
mainly been based upon growing economies.  
Traditional and new measures of competition 
Several methods have been developed over time in order to measure competition in retail 
banking. We can distinguish between two main types of method (see Table 1). One is the more 
traditional industrial organisation (IO) type, for example structure-conduct-performance, bank 
efficiency or economies of scale and scope in banking. The more recent methods have been 
labelled ‘new empirical industrial organisation,’ for instance the Panzar-Rosse H- statistic, 
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conjectural variation models, structural demand models and other structural models. It is 
difficult to do justice to the results of all this research in a summary.  
Table 1. Measuring Competition in Retail Banking: Methods 
Traditional Industrial Organisation 
Structure-conduct-performance 
Bank efficiency 
Economies of scale and scope 
 
New Empirical Industrial Organisation 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) 
Conjectural variations models 
Structural demand models 
Other structural models 
 
Degryse, Kim and Ongena (2009) (chapter 3) review most important research that have looked 
at the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. The idea of this paradigm is that higher 
concentration ratios would cause less competitive conduct and therefore might increase the 
profitability of banking. What is typically observed is that loan rates increase in the 
concentration index, but the magnitude of this relationship varies substantially within the 
different countries. Secondly, looking at deposit rates, it can be observed that they decrease on 
time and savings deposits rates, but again, there is much heterogeneity and the impact of 
concentration seems to become less important over time as well – probably reflecting the 
widening geographical scope of banking. 
These traditional IO methods have been heavily criticised as market structure is endogenous 
(both influence each other and there are difficulties in assessing causality) and may be the result 
of the competitive environment. Several authors have developed econometric methods in order 
to try to deal with these endogeneity problems or to come up with more theory-based methods. 
One of the methods that has been developed is the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic (1987).  
The Panzar-Rosse H-statistic basically looks at the sensitivity of revenues with respect to input 
prices. For perfect competition, price is equal to marginal costs, so if marginal cost increases, 
this should be fully transmitted to prices, so we should have a coefficient that is equal to one. If 
costs increase, revenue should increase one to one. For a monopoly, it is exactly the opposite. 
So the H-statistic should actually be negative. The intermediate forms of competition we would 
label “monopolistic competition.” 
While the H-statistic has limitations, it is probably the only one that to some extent allows us to 
perform a cross-country analysis. Otherwise one has to rely on within-country analysis, because 
very detailed data is needed. It is a reduced-form approach, but it allows us, at least to some 
extent, to discriminate between perfect competition, monopoly and monopolistic competition.  
In a comprehensive cross-country analysis Claessens and Laeven
15 calculate the H-statistic for 
50 countries. They only include countries when there are a sufficient number of banks active in 
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those countries. They find that for the different countries the H-statistic is between 0.6 and 0.8, 
suggesting there is monopolistic competition in the banking markets in these countries. But 
more importantly, when they take the H-statistic and correlate it with concentration indices, they 
observe that they seem to be unrelated, implying that concentration is not a good measure of 
competition. Furthermore, they report that this H-statistic is lower when there are entry or 
activity restrictions. This suggests that entry or activity restrictions are really reducing 
competition in banking markets. 
Competition, stability and lending standards 
We now turn to the issue of competition, stability and lending standards. We start by 
summarising the theoretical insights on competition and stability. There are two different 
theories. The first is the traditional ‘competition-fragility’ view stating that bank competition is 
eroding market power and therefore also the charter value of banking, which may lead to more 
risk-taking. The other view is the ‘competition-stability’ view: the idea is that more competition 
will actually enhance stability, because more money is left on the table for the entrepreneur 
dealing with the bank and this will increase his effort. Therefore, competition reduces the moral 
hazard of the entrepreneur, which is good for banks and for financial stability. 
The empirical work is mainly inconclusive and seems to depend on how competition is 
measured. This refers to Giancarlo Spagnolo’s contribution asking on how to deal with risk. 
Again, what we try to highlight here is that competition and stability (literally all previous work) 
are endogenous, because they depend on the behaviour of regulators and supervisors. 
Competition and stability have been measured during normal periods. Now that we are probably 
in an abnormal period, the question is: how does the relationship between competition and 
stability evolve during a worldwide financial crisis?  
Another issue related to competition concerns stability and lending standards. Recent work has 
looked at lending booms and lending standards from a theoretical and empirical angle. Some 
theories have stated that with a booming economy, all projects seem to be good projects, 
therefore banks become relatively lazy and screen less.
16  A booming economy reduces the 
incentive for banks to actively screen in the economy. Competition makes this effect stronger, 
because the incentive to screen is even lower.  
Giovanni Dell’Ariccia and co-authors
17 have recently looked at the subprime crisis and their 
findings show that an increased number of loan applications, which is capturing the boom, 
reduces the rejection rate of applications at banks, basically suggesting that indeed the lending 
standards in the economy have dropped. In particular, when the number of competing banks 
within the subprime market is decreased the refusal rate dropped further. This suggests that 
competition has in fact lowered lending standards even further. In a crisis, we know that 
economic prospects are not optimal; banks start to screen again and lending standards may 
revert to normal. So what is currently perceived as banks being tough, may be interpreted as 
banks behaving as they should.  
A second issue on competition, stability and lending standards relates to the originate-to-
distribute model. The idea is that banks’ behaviour to issue loans and simply sell them off to 
                                                      
16 Ruckes, M., “Bank competition and credit standards”, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 17, 2004, pp. 
1073-1102; G. Gorton and P. He (2008), “Bank Credit Cycles”, forthcoming in Review of Economic 
Studies. G. Dell’Ariccia and R. Marquez (2006), “Lending Booms and Lending Standards”, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 61, October 2006, pp. 2511-2546.  
17 Dell’Ariccia, G., D. Igan and L. Laeven (2008), Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence From 
The Subprime Mortgage Market, CEPR Discussion Papers 6683, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. 20 | THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND COMPETITION IN RETAIL BANKING 
other market participants has reduced lending standards. The reason for this is that the buyers of 
those loans (of collateralised debt obligations) possibly do not have the monitoring technology 
in the first place and the banks that originate those loans do not have sufficient incentives to 
screen and to monitor, because those loans were expected to be sold and not to remain on their 
balance for too long. This originate-to-distribute model may also have reduced the lending 
standards of banks.
18  
2.  Retail banking sector, regulation and competition 
The second topic is related to the retail banking sector, regulation and competition. It has been 
commonly assumed that banking is special. Regulation is relatively tight in most countries and 
seems to soften competition and restrict banking activities in space and scope. There is 
prudential regulation for banks, but less for non-bank financial intermediaries. Figure 1 shows 
important differences in foreign entry restrictions and government ownership across different 
countries.  
The following questions are worthy of consideration: 
•  What happens after banking deregulation? 
•  How does deregulation affect loan rates? For instance, how are loan rates affected when 
we increase the scope for foreign entry or when we allow for more activities. How does 
this affect competition? 
•  How does it affect interest rate margins? 
Some of these questions are answered by Luc Laeven and co-authors.
19  In a study of 72 
countries they find evidence that if one increases regulation by one standard deviation, this 
increases the interest rate margins by 50-100 basis points. This suggests that entry restrictions 
seem to be important, at least in a cross-country setting. However, once property rights are 
introduced in this regression, these results disappear. The question being: how should we 
understand this analysis? Their interpretation is that bank regulation in each particular country 
probably reflects deeper factors, related to the specifics of the economy itself.  
 
                                                      
18 Keys, B.J., T. Mukherjee, A. Seru and V. Vig (2009), “Securitization and Screening: Evidence From 
Subprime Mortgage Backed Securities”, mimeo. 
19 Demirguc-Kunt, A., L. Laeven and R. Levine (2004), “Regulations, Market Structure, Institutions, and 
the Cost of Financial Intermediation”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 593-622, 
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Figure 1. Banking Regulation Indices (2003) 
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Regulation, market presence and state-owned banks 
Regulation and market presence. Work by Levine
20  has shown that foreign bank entry 
restrictions increase loan rates, whereas domestic entry restrictions do not. When looking at 
transition countries, we can state that foreign entry in general is associated with positive effects, 
typically mostly for transparent firms but also indirectly for SMEs. The question again is to see 
what are the implications of the ongoing financial crisis with regards to foreign entry? ‘Back to 
basics’, which is to some extent the slogan nowadays, means: retrench to your own country – 
probably under pressure from politicians being on the board of the bank. The question remains: 
what exactly is the impact of foreign entry in a period of financial crisis? 
State-owned banks. It is known that state ownership has become pervasive, especially in the last 
year. From the literature we learn that government ownership leads to less competition, slower 
financial development, but some lucky firms may enjoy lower loan rates.
21 Considering the 
current financial crisis, we have seen that government involvement has become widespread in 
many, and the question is: what is the control on those government banks? If politicians are on 
the boards of government-involved banks, will this lead to misdirected loan granting? Could 
this be the seeds for the next crisis? Our opinion is that politicians should not be involved and 
government-owned banks should be managed by professional CEOs. We know what politicians 
on board have implied in the past, so we need to be careful. They might be trying to maximize 
local and personal objectives.  
Regulation and stability. We know that lower barriers to entry and fewer activity restrictions 
lead to less banking fragility.
22  And there appear to be positive dynamic effects following 
deregulation, and well-performing banks seem to gain market share.
23  
Desposit insurance and stability. There is a study by Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache
24 which 
shows that when countries adopt and introduce explicit deposit insurance, this tends to increase 
the likelihood of a banking crisis. Considering the current crisis, competition in deposit 
insurance schemes may induce contagion. We have seen reshuffling deposits from one country 
to another simply due to differing deposit insurance schemes. We think that even though it is set 
at 100,000 EUR across countries now, the funding of those deposit insurances funds matters, as 
well as the credibility of each government. Further, there are ‘too big to fail’-issues and the fact 
that there might not only be explicit deposit insurance, but also implicit deposit insurance. To 
put it bluntly: Can Belgium save all its banks? Can Ireland or Iceland do so?  
                                                      
20 Levine, R. (2003), Denying Foreign Bank Entry: Implications for Bank Interest Margins, Working 
Papers Central Bank of Chile 222, Central Bank of Chile. 
21 Barth, C. and R. Levine (2004), “Bank regulation and supervision: What works best?”, Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, Vol. 13, pp. 205-248. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002), 
“Government Ownership of Banks”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, pp. 265-301. Sapienza, P. (2004), “The 
Effects of Government Ownership on Bank Lending”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 72, pp. 357-
384. 
22 Beck, T., A. Demirgüc-Kunt and R. Levine (2004), “Bank Concentration and Crises”, World Bank, 
mimeo. 
23  Black, S.E. and P.E. Strahan (2002), “Entrepreneurship and Bank Credit Availability”, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 57, pp. 2807-2834. Stiroh, K.J. and P.E. Strahan (2003), “Competitive Dynamics of 
Deregulation: Evidence from U.S. Banking“, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 35, No. 5, pp. 
801-28. 
24  Demirgüc-Kunt, A. and E. Detragiache (2002), “Does deposit insurance increase banking system 
stability? An empirical investigation”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Vol. 49, No. 7, October, 
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So our question is whether there is a call for European-level funding for this. We think that even 
though the de Larosière Report is very interesting, it is not ambitious enough and should go 
much further.  
3. Switching  costs 
Switching costs are the costs that a consumer incurs when they decide to switch from one bank 
to another. It is known that such costs bind a customer to his bank, giving market power to 
banks with greater market shares. The potential for low-cost switching is important in order to 
restrain the market power of banks. Higher switching rates as such should not be a goal of 
competition policy, of course, but having low switching costs should be a goal of competition 
policy.  
There are different types of switching costs. The first are transactional. Examples are the 
administrative burden, customer preferences and choice, closing charges, transportation or shoe 
leather costs, and search costs that may hinder customers to move from one bank to another.  
Secondly, there are the informational switching costs that relate to the idea that outside banks, 
that is, banks that do not have a lending relationship to a particular customer have less 
information about the creditworthiness of borrowers than inside banks, which have an 
informational advantage.  
Transactional switching costs typically have been found to be very important. One positive 
effect of the crisis might have been that people have learned how to switch from one bank to 
another. There have been lots of rotations of deposits, so maybe people are becoming aware that 
switching is not that costly in the end, because there are some learning costs involved as well. 
When we think about informational switching costs, a study by Vasso Ioannidou and Steven 
Ongena
25 ought to be cited that finds that borrowers who switch from one bank to another 
receive an 80 basis points lower loan rate. This result suggests that switching costs may well be 
important in the retail loan market. 
During the financial crisis, banks may have pushed out some borrowers towards other banks 
since they did not have enough liquidity at their disposal. To some extent the informational 
switching costs may have decreased due to the financial crisis, because the adverse selection 
problem is less important as switching firms are more likely to be of good quality.  
How to reduce transactional switching costs? One can try to reduce the administrative burden, 
for instance through switching arrangements, which are in place in a number of countries. Such 
arrangements facilitate current account switching as the old and the new bank interact in order 
to reduce the administrative burden, payment delays and potential misclassifications. Perceived 
costs and risks that some transactions may possibly go wrong are also important when reducing 
transaction costs, as has been shown in a study by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in the UK.
26 
The gains of switching may also be underestimated by current account holders due to a lack of 
transparency; people simply do not seem to be aware of the potential gains they may receive 
when switching accounts.  
A good way to reduce transactional switching costs, at least for the current account, might be to 
introduce account number portability, as exists for telecom services. The idea is that the 
customer simply takes his number to another bank, which would reduce switching costs 
                                                      
25 Ioannidou, V. and S. Ongena, “Time for a Change: Loan Conditions and Bank Behavior When Firms 
Switch Banks”, Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
26 Office of Fair Trading (2008), Personal current accounts in the UK, http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/ 
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substantially. There are some issues with the governance of such a system, of course, and the 
costs and investments to achieve this may actually be quite considerable.  
Information-sharing mechanisms are mentioned in Giancarlo Spagnolo’s contribution; basically 
the fact that some banks may or may not have access to the information that is shared about 
borrowers between banks. Information-sharing between banks, i.e., with central banks or private 
registries keeping credit exposure and repayment records, may reduce the hold-up problem, 
because the customer knows that other banks have information about him, and this should 
induce additional competition.  
Bouckaert and Degryse (2006)
27 argue that privacy laws may also be important as regards the 
impact of information sharing, because privacy laws determine which type of information is 
available to competing firms, and whether this information can be shared with alternative 
providers. Privacy restricts sharing information that is collected by a bank with another bank.
28 
This might have a cost when it reduces competition and therefore the customer might pay a 
higher price. There may be a potential trade-off between on the one hand restrictive privacy 
laws and on the other hand competition. But these models are not always unidirectional, of 
course.  
Considering the current crisis, information-sharing may help in transmitting information from 
one lender to another. Perhaps the countries that have information-sharing mechanisms in place 
may be the ones that get out of the crisis faster compared to other countries – but this is pure 
speculation on our part.  
4. Concluding  remarks 
Financial depth and financial development are important drivers of economic growth. 
Understanding how competition and regulation affect the financial sector is therefore important 
for the future of the economic environment. Financial deregulation has spurred foreign bank 
entry and increased banking competition. The recent crisis, however, has shown that 
competition and certain financial innovations within an inadequate regulatory environment may 
lead to a deterioration of lending standards and possibly also financial instability. Furthermore, 
empirical evidence reveals that government involvement may potentially lead to inappropriate 
lending behaviour by banks.  
The ongoing financial crisis shows that a further understanding of an optimal design of financial 
regulation and supervision and the optimal degree of competition in banking and financial 
markets needs to be on the top of the political and academic agenda. Financial literacy would 
seem to be an area that could be addressed by education. For example, greater consumer 
education about financial alternatives may help consumers to consider switching and reduce 
rents from switching costs. 
                                                      
27 Bouckaert, J. and H. Degryse (2006), Opt-in versus Opt-out: a free entry analysis of privacy policies, 
http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/tilec/publications/discussionpapers/2006-024.pdf 
28 Information sharing may be further restricted for several other reasons (see e.g. Jentzsch, Nicola (2007). 
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Retail Finance: Rethinking regulation and consumer 
protection in the wake of the financial crisis 
Professor Roman Inderst, Johann Wolfgang Goethe–Universität, Frankfurt 
am Main (IMFS) 
 
1. Background 
At least from the beginning of 2007, the problems brewing in the US subprime market were 
becoming evident. This focused international attention on the area of retail finance – an area that 
typically receives much less attention than the fancier world of wholesale finance and 
investment banking. As the crisis deepened, however, attention quickly shifted back to the 
wholesale end, such as the markets for asset-backed securities and credit default swaps. Only 
occasionally did the retail side of the crisis resurface, for instance when it came to protecting 
banks’ retail deposits. 
Still, the present crisis provides an opportunity to rethink existing legislature and regulation that 
govern the delivery of financial products to households, both on the ‘asset side’ of the balance 
sheet, such as savings and investments, and on the ‘liability side’, such as consumer credit and 
mortgages. Such a rethink offers the chance to devise future legislation and supervision on 
sound economic principles. Only then can we hope to create a consistent body of legislative and 
regulatory work that serves the citizens of Europe. 
A rethink of the general principles of consumer protection is also long overdue in the light of 
past and ongoing initiatives of the European Commission. Clearly, on a general level the 
consumer directive represents a cornerstone. More specifically, with MiFID, much progress has 
been made in the area of financial instruments, including retail finance. But how do these 
various directives fit together, say, when it comes to the different treatment of insurance 
products with a savings and investment character and retail financial products? 
Take the case of the initiative to harmonise the law governing early repayment clauses for 
mortgages. Presumably, one side effect of such harmonisation may have been the creation of a 
European market for mortgages and mortgage-related products. There is probably little political 
appetite to support such a project at the moment. However, the idea to impose a minimum 
statutory repayment right, which mortgage-takers would not be able to waive, has also received 
support based on the notion of consumer protection. 
European countries exhibit a baffling diversity in how households finance their mortgages, 
varying in their use of fixed versus variable interest rates and the amount of debt in relation to a 
property’s value. Housing market conditions and national law may explain some of the 
differences. The use of prepayment clauses or lock-in clauses also varies widely. An 
understanding of what drives these national differences is clearly a necessary first step before 
drafting a plan to harmonise existing laws or even imposing contractual uniformity across 
Europe. 
A different policy instrument will be looked at in this paper: the disclosure of conflicts of 
interest and thus, in particular, of commissions and ‘kickbacks’ that financial intermediaries or 
advisors receive. Such a requirement is part of MiFID, though it remains to be seen to what 
extent member states and their national agencies, as well as courts, enforce compliance. 
Contractual lock-ins and the potential role of statutory provisions for early cancellation will also 
be discussed, with specific focus on the role of financial advice in these two areas. 28 | RETAIL FINANCE: RETHINKING REGULATION & CONSUMER PROTECTION 
To conclude there will be one or two observations on competition and innovation, stressing that 
viable competition, when governed by an adequate set of rules, is the best recipe for the 
protection of almost all consumers, generally and with respect to financial and insurance 
products in particular. That being said, this leaves ample scope for an active consumer 
protection policy that sets rules and sanctions misbehaviour. 
2.  Putting consumer protection and retail banking regulation on a 
sound basis 
The financial decisions taken by households have increasingly attracted the attention of 
academics. This increased interest is driven by the profound changes to households’ personal 
balance sheets, which became longer, as homes have substantially increased in value; on the 
asset side, expected payouts from pay-as-you-go pension schemes were replaced by 
contributions to pillar II or pillar III pension schemes. On the liability side, we have witnessed, 
at least in some countries, a massive increase in secured and unsecured debt. 
Academic literature, most notably the large body of literature on household finance, has almost 
completely ignored the role of the supply side. But for retail finance this is key. Retail financial 
and insurance products are often ‘not bought but sold’: The initiative is taken by a broker or a 
client’s relationship banker. Moreover, with the exception of the most sophisticated investors, or 
those brave or unsuspecting enough to take bets with online brokers, retail financial investors 
also rely on advice. 
2.1  Mapping the trilateral agency problem with financial advice 
In countries like the UK, independent financial advisors play a key role. They may either advise 
customers on a fee base, or more often will earn profits through more or less hidden 
commissions and product-based charges that reduce yield. 
Irrespective of whether products are sold through a firm’s integrated channel, as in the case of 
many retail banks, or whether sales rely on third parties, as is often the case with insurance, a 
trilateral agency problem arises: between the customer, the agent or employee, and the product 
provider. What is more, the respective agent, be it an insurance broker or a financial advisor, 
may undertake multiple tasks. These tasks may include searching for customers, getting 
acquainted with new products, getting to know a customer’s personal circumstances, and finally 
providing advice and concluding a sale. 
Commissions paid to these agents thus have multiple roles to perform. Policy intervention that 
will stifle commissions or impact on their form may have beneficial implications along one task, 
say to reduce the bias of advice, but they may generate unintended consequences along other 
tasks, resulting ultimately in a reduction of social efficiency. 
In recent work, mostly with Marco Ottaviani from Kellogg, I have looked into the multiple 
functions performed by commissions and the impact of policy intervention. Take the case of a 
mandatory disclosure of commissions. 
When customers do not have appropriate expectations about the level of commissions, the 
market will clearly malfunction, as they underestimate the prevailing conflict of interest. To 
look at one example outside the area of retail finance: the margins earned by sellers are 
sometimes excessive, given that the targeted customers seem to be reluctant shoppers, as work 
in the UK on doorstep selling has shown. Stupendously high commissions are the incentive to 
coax customers into a purchase. Here, the case for disclosing commissions to unsuspecting or 
even naïve customers is clearly warranted. THE FUTURE OF RETAIL BANKING IN EUROPE: COMPETITION AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES | 29 
Our research shows, however, that mandatory disclosure can be socially harmful by stifling the 
roll-out of more efficient products. While reducing bias in advice, such disclosure may also 
stifle the acquisition of information by advisors. Overall, this may imply that the quality of 
advice deteriorates. 
Our research also sheds light on when we should expect problems of unsuitable advice and mis-
selling to be more pervasive, and when not. When product providers’ own agency problems 
with their employees or, likewise, with independent advisors or an independent sales force 
become more severe, mis-selling is more likely. Competition can induce problems of mis-
selling, as fiercer competition among agents forces firms to restructure their commissions more 
aggressively. Furthermore, consumers may still benefit. When consumers are more complacent, 
more of the burden of being vigilant shifts to supervision. 
Furthermore, when advisors earn their profits only through an hourly fee and no longer through 
commissions based on subsequent sales, biased advice clearly becomes a lesser concern. But the 
overall quality of advice and thus of households’ investment or credit decisions may still suffer 
when regulation intervenes by favouring a particular means of paying for advice. Earning a 
commission on a subsequent sale may be necessary to provide an agent with sufficient 
incentives to really exert effort and provide valuable advice. This is the subject of ongoing 
research. 
Without understanding the economics of advice, any interference in the market is doomed to 
generate unintended consequences. Clearly, not every effect that a theoretical model generates is 
of first-order importance in a particular market. This is where institutional knowledge, as well as 
empirical analysis, must meet up with sound economic theory. 
Based on a generous grant from the European Research Council, we are currently building up a 
centre for the research on the regulation of retail finance at the Institute of Financial Stability in 
Frankfurt. This will be in close cooperation with other European universities and legal scholars. 
The issue of consumer protection is at the core here. 
2.2 Principles  of  consumer protection 
At the risk of over-simplifying, there appear to be two views of consumer protection. One view 
holds that consumers must be protected from other parties, that is firms’ possibly hazardous 
products or, say, misleading advertising and aggressive sales strategies. 
The other view holds that consumers must be protected from themselves: even when given full 
information, a wide range of products and services, as well as access to valuable advice, 
consumers will make choices that are, so the argument goes, not in their own long-term interests. 
Arguably, the complexity of many financial products poses a substantial challenge to consumers. 
This holds, in particular, for countries where financial literacy is low and where households 
have not had long-term experience in making financial decisions. 
The area of household finance has made advances in documenting and explaining household 
portfolio choice. Research on this frontier is driven by puzzles, such as low stock market 
participation, under-diversification or, on the credit side, the sluggish refinancing behaviour of 
mortgage holders.
29 Literature on behavioural finance documents further ‘biases’, at least among 
some investors, such as overconfidence.
30 
                                                      
29 E.g., Campbell (2006). 
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Policy-makers should be warned to draw too definite conclusions from the existing academic 
literature. Many studies are based on experiments – and there is substantive doubt about the 
interpretation of these results. With regards to field studies, it must be borne in mind that the 
results may be very sensitive to the particular country and, therefore, the social and cultural 
background of the respective customers. For instance, an influential strand of literature 
presumes that the typical consumer procrastinates. 
Proponents of this view then suggest that consumers are ill-serviced by credit products that 
tempt them, say through low teaser rates, to consume more and save less than what is actually 
good for them. Indeed, the assumption of such procrastination is often justified by households’ 
low rate of savings. Needless to say, this view is based on observations from the US and not, 
say, from Germany, where there is a much higher savings rate. 
Clearly, with retail financial products there is much scope for firms to misrepresent information, 
say on costs or risk, and there is much scope for households to misinterpret information. To the 
extent that the industry collectively fails to develop and adhere to sufficiently high standards, 
policy intervention is called for, in the interests of both consumers and firms with a long-term 
view. 
That being said, the key principle of consumer protection regarding retail financial products 
should still be to protect consumers from misbehaving firms, rather than from their own biases 
or follies. And even then the first reaction of an economist should still be to ask: why does the 
market not provide a solution without intervention? 
Let us consider the case of mandatory minimum cancellation rights. This seems particularly 
relevant with respect to savings and investment products that are wrapped into insurance 
products. Such cancellation rights protect consumers when buying with imperfect information 
about their preferences, for instance, as they will learn over time. 
Current research shows that cancellation rights also protect rational customers from being ill-
advised by sellers who, armed with particularly complex products, may possess superior 
information at the time of a purchase. Generous cancellation rights then make unsuitable advice 
more costly for the seller. Or, put into economic lingo, they make ‘cheap talk hard’. 
But with wary, rational consumers there is no need for policy intervention. Firms have every 
incentive to offer the so-called second-best efficient contractual terms, given that through higher 
prices they can extract any additional value that is created by commitment to better advice. 
However, as we show, policy intervention is warranted when some consumers are excessively 
credulous in that they do not see through a seller’s strategic talk and are blind to the conflict of 
interest. 
Interestingly, we show that a minimum statutory right of cancellation may then be effective 
even when it is not binding, given that many or even all firms offer more generous terms. This is 
the case as such a minimum statutory right makes it less profitable for firms to target only 
credulous consumers as opposed to targeting all consumers. But when firms cater to both wary 
and credulous consumers, then the former essentially take care of their less sophisticated fellow 
consumers. Our research also suggests that a different regulatory approach may be appropriate 
for different sales channels. 
3.  Competition and innovation 
Competition is the most powerful ally of consumers. And, in contrast to some oft-made claims, 
there is also no clear-cut trade-off between financial stability and competition. 
Admittedly, a long tradition in the theory of banking argues that more competition leads to more 
risk taking and thus higher default risk, which brings us back to the present financial crisis. THE FUTURE OF RETAIL BANKING IN EUROPE: COMPETITION AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES | 31 
More recent work qualifies this view, however, both theoretically and empirically.
31 Moreover, 
in cases where such a negative trade-off between competition and stability exists, policy and 
supervision are the first to be blamed: either because regulation and government intervention 
created exploitable situations in the first place; or because supervision did not react flexibly 
enough. 
The present financial crisis cannot be seen as a verdict on the superiority of government 
intervention and regulation compared to market forces. On the contrary: government 
interference in the subprime market sowed the seeds of destruction and at least in some 
countries, such as Germany, it was, in particular, banks with politicians on their boards, such as 
the Landesbanken, who took the worst gambles. 
Regulation and supervision has failed by shying away from addressing the problems early 
enough: the large exposure of banks to ever more complex off-balance sheet risk was not an 
‘unknown unknown’, but a ‘known unknown’. Supervisors failed to be proactive. Regulatory 
capture may have been one reason for this. 
A word should be said on the virtues of the market. In some European countries there is clearly 
the risk that the present financial crisis will stifle market forces for a long time. The two main 
forces are industry consolidation, where there is already high concentration and, as I fear, 
regulation and supervision that frame vigorous competition and the development of new 
business models as ‘systemic risk factors’ that need to be subdued. 
A case in place is clearly the tie-up between HBOS and Lloyds. HBOS is the UK's biggest 
mortgage lender, writing one in five of all new home loans, while Lloyds is the third biggest 
lender overall. The two groups may end up having a combined mortgage book of, at first count, 
three times the size of the next biggest rival, Nationwide. HBOS is also the biggest savings 
provider, while Lloyds is the third largest. Recent inquiries into the UK’s banking market, as 
well as decisions by the UK’s Competition Commission, all shared one view: further 
consolidation should not be permitted, even under wide-ranging remedies.
32 
3.1  Too much innovation? 
Competition can be viewed as a main force to generate innovation. While central bankers may 
wish for more ‘boredom’, as expressed by the UK’s governor, even in the case of finance and 
banking, innovation is something that must be fostered rather than stifled. 
Even without talking about ‘weapons of mass destruction’ in the guise of new financial products, 
one could agree with Miller (1986): “The major impulses to successful innovations over the past 
20 years have come, I am saddened to have to say, from regulation and taxes”. Still, financial 
innovations arguably complete the market, address agency concerns and information 
asymmetries, minimise transaction costs, or respond to new risk factors or new technological 
developments.
33  There are many examples in retail finance, including the distribution of 
exchange-traded funds, the introduction of internet banking, or process innovations such as 
credit scoring.
34 
                                                      
31 On the theoretical side, see Inderst et al. (2008). On the empirical side, see Boyd et al. (2006). 
32 The Cruickshank report in 2000 urged the government to put a stop to the further consolidation of the 
industry. The Competition Commission stopped, for instance, the proposed merger of Lloyds and Abbey 
National. 
33 See Tufano (2002) or Merton (1992) for a more detailed discussion. 
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Often, shifts are more gradual, as in the case of mortgages. A key part of the innovative process 
is that firms experiment with the marketing of well-known products.
35 But this is not to suggest 
that every newly introduced contract was to the benefit of customers.
36 
For instance, ‘endowment’ or ‘savings and equity’ mortgages may offer tax advantages to some 
households. But other households may have simply underestimated the risk of the bundled-in 
equity-investment plan. 
Still, there may still be plenty of scope for beneficial innovations. For instance, a roll-out of 
fairly-priced reverse mortgages could potentially benefit many ageing households.
37 Also, the 
further development of credit scoring will continue to reduce transaction costs and to facilitate 
entry into local markets, bringing down interest rates and broadening access to loans.
38 For the 
US, various studies indeed find that the market for borrowing has become more perfect, as 
measured by the reduced volatility of consumer spending or a closer alignment of consumption 
and long-term income prospects.
39 
But who are the main innovators? While this is a key theme in industrial organisation, the 
literature on retail finance is thin. Earlier studies suggest that size is important, in particular for 
the introduction and roll-out of new services.
40  More recent studies suggest, however, that 
smaller firms are more innovative.
41 According to a recent study that exploits articles from the 
business press, by far the most innovative firm in the US was Merrill Lynch. 
This brings to mind the following story. (In-)famously, in 1977, it was also Merrill Lynch that 
invented the Cash Management Account, in effect allowing non-banks to circumvent the 
equally infamous Regulation-Q. As some will know, this regulation capped deposit rates and 
forbade banks from paying interest on checking deposits. The market’s innovations forced 
regulators to phase-out Regulation Q and to override state usury ceilings.
42 The benefits that this 
innovation brought to ordinary savers should be obvious. 
4. Concluding  remarks 
The present crisis provides an opportunity to rethink consumer protection in the area of retail 
finance. Consumer protection policy can and must be put on a sound economic basis, though 
surely enriched with insights from other disciplines such as psychology. I also have emphasised 
that vigorous competition should be seen as a key ally to consumer protection. That is not to say 
that competition policy is an adequate substitute for consumer protection policy. Healthy 
competition relies on a set of rules that constrain firms’ opportunistic behaviour, irrespective of 
whether these rules are self-imposed by industry standards or through policy intervention. 
                                                      
35 A consequence is that shifts across countries are not homogeneous. For instance, fixed-rate contracts 
have picked up in some European countries, as in the UK, while variable-rate contracts have become 
more common in others, as in Denmark. See Miles and Pillonca (2007). 
36 E.g., Scanion and Whitehead (2004). 
37 Furthermore, in the absence of inflation indexing, once inflation picks up, many mortgages may have 
an excessively skewed repayment profile, in terms of ‘front-end loading’. e.g., Campbell and Cocco 
(2003). 
38 DeYoung et al. (2008), for instance, document this for small business lending, where the form of 
borrowing is similar to that of unsecured household loans. 
39 E.g., Gerardi et al. (2007) or Dynan et al. (2006). 
40 E.g., Frame and Wright (2002) and Tufano (2002). 
41 See Lerner (2007). 
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I would hope that there will be as much progress of good economics in the area of consumer 
protection as there has been in recent decades in the area of competition policy. This does not 
only apply to academics, but more importantly to the policy practised by the relevant agencies, 
most notably the European Commission. By setting high standards of good economic practice, 
both in terms of valid and consistent arguments and in terms of empirical evidence, the 
European Commission’s competition policy has recently provided a valuable motivating and 
disciplining force for national agencies in Europe. What is more, in the area of competition 
policy the process of drafting new rules and guidelines is by now heavily influenced by sound 
academic work. It is to be hoped that a similar direction will be taken in the area of consumer 
protection in financial services, again with a leading role being taken by the European 
institutions. 
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Between Competition and Regulation: 
The conditionality of bailout plans  
Damien Gerard, Research Fellow, Chair of European Law, University of 
Louvain (UCL) 
 
Background 
Since the beginning of the financial crisis, the European Commission has attached stringent 
conditions on the beneficiaries of the so-called ‘bailout plans’ devised by EU member states to 
rescue ailing banks. These conditions were deemed necessary to ensure the compatibility of the 
bailout plans with EU State aid rules. In effect, they enabled the Commission to pursue a 
combination of competition and regulatory objectives in dealing with the unprecedented 
challenges raised by the crisis. In the words of EU Competition Commissioner Kroes: “[T]he 
current financial crisis is a good illustration of one of the ways regulation and competition law 
are connected”.
43 In her view, competition policy is there both to palliate the shortcomings of 
regulation and to prevent the excesses thereof, notably in stifling market dynamics: 
(i) “if the current financial and economic crisis has taught us anything, it is that there is a high 
price to pay when regulation fails, and that competition policy is essential for keeping our 
economy working well”; but (ii) “in the midst of the massive government interventions, we 
need to make sure that we do not – along the way – also lose the level playing field and the 
future dynamism that comes from competition”.
44  
This contribution illustrates the Commission’s reliance on EU state aid rules to pursue a 
complex mix of competition and regulatory objectives in the framework of the financial crisis. 
Section 1 sketches the framework that enabled the Commission to review bailout plans and 
condition their implementation. Section 2 then shows how the Commission attempted to address 
some of the regulatory failures that allowed for “unrestricted and exaggerated risk taking” by 
credit institutions.
45  Section 3 explains, subsequently, how the Commission undertook to 
prevent or mitigate market distorting effects resulting from the implementation of bailout plans. 
In closing, Section 4 questions some of the competition policy options pursued by the 
Commission in dealing with the crisis, notably with regards to compatibility with the EU 
internal market policy. The contribution also points to various instances where the conditions 
imposed and/or negotiated by the Commission impacted on the structure of credit institutions 
and their business practices (including retail banking services), with potentially long-term 
consequences.  
Fundamentally, the interaction between competition and regulation is one of the great puzzles of 
economic policy, which affects a great variety of sectors in the economy.
46 For a long time, the 
financial sector was both heavily regulated and largely exempted from the application of 
competition rules. That trend reversed somewhat in the years preceding the crisis. One of the 
great challenges for the future of the banking sector in Europe (and elsewhere) probably lies in 
                                                      
43 Kroes, N., “The interface between regulation and competition law”, speech at the Bundeskartellamt 
Conference on Dominant Companies – The Thin Line between Regulation and Competition Law, 
Hamburg, 28 April 2009 (SPEECH 09/202).  
44 Idem. 
45 Those are, again, the words of Commissioner Kroes, as delivered on the same occasion. 
46 For a recent account, see F. Lévêque and H. Shelanski (eds), Antitrust and Regulation in the EU and the 
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finding a new equilibrium between competition and regulation, reflecting both the fundamentals 
of the markets and lessons from the crisis. In view of recent events, the interaction between 
competition and regulation in relation to the financial crisis could be illustrated as follows:  
Figure 1. The competition/regulation conundrum and the financial crisis 
FAILURE 
 
 
COMPETITION                                                           REGULATION 
 
 
FAILURE 
 
1.  EU competition policy and the financial crisis: General framework  
Development of the financial crisis  
Since mid-September 2007, EU member states have been forced to take emergency measures to 
prevent the bankruptcy of credit institutions and the meltdown of the financial system. In the EU, 
troubles started with the bank run on Northern Rock in the UK and then spread to German 
Landesbanken and other credit institutions which relied on assets securitisation to fuel their 
growth and had invested heavily in mortgage-backed securities. At that time, solvency issues 
were treated on an ad hoc basis and were considered largely as the tail of a predominantly 
American problem, namely the subprime crisis. However, the crisis took a systemic turn with 
Lehman Brothers’ filing for Chapter 11 protection on September 15, 2008 and the resulting 
general loss of confidence that affected financial markets, leading to a freeze in inter-bank 
lending that threatened the operations and the very survival of banks with high refinancing 
needs and lower solvency ratios.  
European Union involvement in dealing with the financial crisis  
In the EU, emergency measures to cope with the crisis have been adopted at the level of 
individual or groups of member states,
47   mainly in the form of state guarantees and 
recapitalisation measures. Realistically, it could not have been otherwise in view of the absence 
of an institutionalised forum at EU level competent to deal with such issues.
48 In particular, 
                                                      
47 Indeed, the size and cross-border operation of credit institutions forced certain member states to pull 
resources together in structuring recapitalisation schemes. This was for example the case of Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg with respect to the rescue of Fortis and of Belgium, Luxembourg and 
France with respect to Dexia.  
48  Some instruments of coordination already existed but quickly showed their limits in view of the 
magnitude of the crisis. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Financial 
Supervisory Authorities, Central Banks and Finance Ministries of the European Union on Cross-Border 
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member states are where the money is and where the borrowing capabilities lie and economic 
policy remains largely a member state competence.  
Nonetheless, the EU also played a pivotal role since the inception of the crisis by providing 
guidance and coordinating the various national initiatives. The Eurogroup, that is the meeting of 
euro area countries, took the lead in devising common principles aimed to respond effectively to 
the crisis, which were then endorsed by the European Council.
49  With the support of the 
European Central Bank (ECB), the Commission was then involved in the actual design and 
coordination of each and every recovery plan and individual rescue measures envisaged by 
member states. Indeed, all rescue measures or bailout plans imply state intervention into the 
economy, whether in the form of guarantees, capital injections or other means, and qualify as 
‘state aid’ pursuant to Art. 87 of the EC Treaty (now 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, TFEU). In accordance with Art. 88(3) EC (now 108(3) TFEU), member states 
are bound to notify the Commission of all plans to grant state aid and to withhold the 
implementation thereof pending the Commission’s approval, which can be accompanied by 
various conditions.  
By early June 2009, the Commission had adopted more than 50 decisions and approved more 
than 3 trillion euro in aid, amounting to 24% of EU GDP.
50 In doing so, the Commission acted 
swiftly, most of the time in a matter of days. It also endeavoured to offer general guidance to 
assist member states in the design of bailout plans and other rescue measures, thereby enhancing 
legal certainty and contributing to stabilising the situation.
51  
Conditionality of bailout plans: Legal bases  
The conditions imposed by the Commission on the benefit of bailout plans were rooted in two 
different legal provisions, which were applied successively as the financial crisis unfolded. One 
can distinguish between two phases in the financial crisis: a first ‘subprime’ one culminating 
with the Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, and a second 
‘systemic’ one that started with the same event. During the first phase, the Commission 
examined case-by-case rescue measures aimed to address liquidity difficulties of credit 
institutions exposed to the subprime crisis according to established rules on subsidies for firms 
in difficulty
52 adopted pursuant to Article 87(3)(c) EC (now Art. 107(3)(c) TFUE).  
                                                                                                                                                            
Financial Stability, June 1, 2008, ECFIN/CEFCPE(2008)REP/53106 REV REV.  
49  “Declaration on a concerted European action plan of the euro area countries”, 10 October 2008 
(available at www.ue2008.fr); European Council of 15-16 October 2008, Presidency Conclusions (doc. 
14368/08). 
50  The Commission keeps an up-to-date list of all national measures adopted as a response to the 
financial/economic crisis on its website at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/recovery/cases.html. 
51 In particular, the Commission issued a number of Communications outlining its policy in reviewing 
rescue plans for banks: (i) Communication from the Commission of September 13, 2008 on the 
application of state aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the 
current global financial crisis (the “Banking Communication”), O.J. [2008] C 270, p.8; (ii) Commission 
Communication of December 5, 2008 on the recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current 
financial crisis: limitation of the aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions 
of competition, O.J. [2009] C10, p. 2 (the “Recapitalisation Communication”); (iii) Communication from 
the Commission of February 25, 2009 on the treatment of impaired assets in the Community banking 
sector, O.J. [2009] C 72, p. 1; (iv) Communication from the Commission of July 23, 2009 entitled “The 
return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis 
under the State aid rules”, O.J. [2009] C195, p. 9.  
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From September 2008 on, the Commission acknowledged the systemic nature of the crisis and 
started reviewing general rescue schemes and ad hoc measures put in place by member states 
according to Article 87(3)(b) EC (now Art. 107(3)(b) TFUE), a rarely-used and more lenient 
provision applicable in case of “serious disturbance in the economy of the relevant Member 
State”.
53 
Table 1. The legal basis for the Commission’s actions 
  Nature Timing  Legal  basis 
Phase 1  Subprime crisis  Pre-Lehman failure  Art. 87(3)(c) EC: “firms in 
difficulty” 
Phase 2  Systemic crisis  Post-Lehman failure  Art. 87(3)(b) EC: “serious 
disturbance in the economy” 
 
Conditionality of bailout plans: Policy objectives  
As apparent from various policy statements, in particular the Banking Communication,
54 the 
Commission has been driven by two main policy objectives in applying state aid principles to 
national bailout plans. First, it has been keen on preventing distortions of competition in the 
internal market, whether in the form of protectionist schemes designed for domestic credit 
institutions only or disproportionate support that would have allowed national banks to expand 
artificially into neighbouring markets and/or, generally, gaining a competitive edge over 
competitors not benefiting from the same support. As a result, compliance with the general 
principles of non-discrimination and proportionality has been at the centre of the Commission’s 
attention. This was achieved mainly by setting strict eligibility and remuneration requirements 
for the benefit of state support, whether in the form of guarantees, loans or capital injections.
55 
Second, the Commission has been guided by a concern to address moral hazard issues and thus 
to ensure that financial institutions retain the right incentives, that is the incentive to re-orient 
their businesses towards long-term stability over short-term profits and to deliver efficient 
services to customers. Conversely, it was firmly committed to prevent failed business models to 
perpetuate.
56 
To achieve those objectives, the Commission has conditioned the authorisation of bailout plans 
to: (i) behavioural requirements directed at both shareholders/investors and managers of 
distressed credit institutions to ensure that they bear their fair share of responsibility, do not 
internalize the possibility of being bailed out in the future (the so-called ‘too-big-to-fail’ 
syndrome) and stop engaging in strategies aimed at inflating balance sheets to the detriment of 
core banking activities; and (ii) both structural and behavioural requirements directed at 
distressed banks to ensure that they undertake effective restructuring and to prevent sound banks 
                                                                                                                                                            
Restructuring Firms in Difficulty, O.J., 2004, C 244/2. 
53  Article 87(3)(b) EC, compared to state aid rules for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty 
adopted pursuant to Article 87(3)(c) EC, offers additional flexibility as to the nature of acceptable aids 
(e.g., structural interventions), the duration thereof (i.e., going beyond 6 months) and the need for 
structural compensatory measures. 
54 See above, note 9. 
55  For a thorough analysis, see D. Gerard, “EC competition law at grips with the financial crisis: 
flexibility on the means, consistency in the principles”, Concurrences, No. 1-2009, pp. 46-62.  
56  Kroes, N., “The return to long-term viability”, speech at the European Parliament, Brussels, 19 
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engaging in reasonable strategies to become unduly disadvantaged. Those conditions have had a 
direct impact on the management of credit institutions and on the supply of retail banking 
services. They will be explored in more detail successively in sections 2 and 3 below, according 
to the following scheme: 
Table 2. Conditionality of bailout plans 
Conditionality of bailout plans 
Moral hazard 
issues 
Shareholders/ 
Investors  Managers  Addressees 
Distortions of 
competition  Behavioural  Structural  Nature 
 
2.  Conditions aimed at addressing moral hazard issues 
Conditions addressed to shareholders/investors  
As noted, one of the main concerns of the Commission in dealing with moral hazard issues was 
to ensure that shareholders/investors support their fair share of the consequences of the financial 
turmoil and of the costs associated with the rescue measures provided by member states.
57 To 
that end, various conditions have been imposed to the benefit of state guarantees, on the one 
hand, and of capital injections, on the other hand.  
Guarantees. The first condition attached to the benefit of state guarantee schemes related to the 
eligible debt instruments, which are limited, in essence, to retail and wholesale deposits and 
short-and medium-term debts and exclude hybrid and subordinated debts considered as Tier 2 
capital (e.g., covered bonds).
58 Likewise, the benefit of guarantees must be subject to proper 
remuneration in the form of service fees based on institution-specific risk and fixed premiums 
set according to a methodology devised by the ECB.
59  
Capital injections. The key issue in relation to the benefit of state recapitalisation measures has 
been the proper remuneration thereof. Eventually, a distinction was introduced between the 
remuneration of capital provided to insolvent or distressed credit institutions, on the one hand, 
and capital provided to ‘sound’ banks to strengthen their capital ratio and/or ensure the 
continuous supply of credit to the ‘real economy’, on the other.
60 Again, the ECB came up with 
a methodology to calculate proper remuneration rates with the double objective of helping 
banks – thus providing for an interest rate below market rates – while maintaining sufficient 
incentives for banks to redeem the capital injected and exit the state support scheme.
61 Overall, 
the benefit of capital injections was conditioned on an annual return comprised between 8 and 
12%. Given their structural character, recapitalisation schemes have been considered much 
                                                      
57 This is particularly apparent from the conditions surrounding the eligibility of debt instrument for the 
benefit of State guarantees.  
58  Banking Communication, ¶21. For a discussion, see, e.g., the Commission decision approving the 
Danish (NN 51/2008) and Spanish (N 54/2008) rescue plans.  
59 On 20 October 2008, the European Central Bank issued “Recommendations on government guarantees 
on bank debt”, which were largely relied upon by member states and the Commission in setting adequate 
remuneration rates.  
60 Recapitalisation Communication, ¶3  
61 Recommendations of the ECB Governing Council on the pricing of recapitalisations, 20 November 
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more carefully by the Commission than guarantee schemes and therefore subject to tighter 
requirements, including:  
(i)  limitations on the distribution of dividends in the form of either an outright prohibition 
pending redemption
62  or the grant of a special dividend/coupon for the state.
63 The 
underlying rationale is that taxpayer money ought not to serve remunerating capital but to 
enable banks to pursue their activities with a focus on long-term stability rather than 
short-term returns;  
(ii)  limitations on share buyback programmes, which were imposed for roughly the same 
reason as limitations on the distribution of dividends, either in the form of an outright 
prohibition pending redemption
64 or subject to approval by State Board representatives;
65 
and  
(iii)  the possibility for states to exercise oversight and/or control on important strategic 
decisions of recapitalized banks, either through the issuance of preferred shares carrying 
extra rights,
66 and/or the appointment of State Board representatives carrying special veto 
rights.
67  
Apparent from the above is that the Commission has left a margin of discretion to member 
states to reflect country- or institution- specific circumstances in devising the most appropriate 
mechanisms. 
Conditions addressed at managers  
The Commission has also endeavoured to mitigate moral hazard issues on the part of managers 
with a view to ensuring that they are guided by the right incentives and favour stability over 
excessive risk taking. Accordingly, it has viewed positively the dismissal of the management of 
ailing banks such as Sachsen Landesbank (C 9/2008) or Fortis (NN 42/2008), the review of risk 
management and corporate governance practices as in the Commerzbank case (N 625/2008) and 
the imposition of limitations on managers’ compensations and severance packages.  
However, the implementation of those conditions was largely left to member states so that, in 
practice, they have taken various forms across the EU, reflecting national corporate culture or 
political priorities. The diversity of approaches is particularly striking as far as the regulation of 
managers’ compensations is concerned: for example, France (N 618/2008) mandated 
compliance with ethics rules aimed at executives and traders and prohibited severance package 
in case of “management failure”, while Greece (N 560/2008) decided to cap the level of 
compensation of bank executives at the level of that of the Chairman of the Greek Central 
Bank.
68 
                                                      
62 See the Commission decisions approving the rescue plans of Germany (N 512/2008) and Denmark (N 
51/2008).  
63 See the Commission decisions concerning ING (N 528/2008) and the Anglo Irish Bank (N 9/2009).  
64 Commission decision approving the Irish rescue plan (N 48/2008).  
65 See, e.g., the ING decision (N 528/2008).  
66 See, e.g., the Allied Irish Bank decision (N 241/2009).  
67 See, e.g., the Commission decisions approving the rescue plans of Greece, Ireland and the Netherlands.  
68 In the UK, key measures included: (i) no 2008 cash bonus; (ii) compliance with best practice codes; (iii) 
dismissal at reasonable and fair cost. In Germany, executive compensation was capped at € 500 K and 
contractual severance terms were prohibited. Ireland established a public committee to oversight 
compensation and ‘golden parachute’ issues. Denmark chose to prohibit any new stock-option plans.  THE FUTURE OF RETAIL BANKING IN EUROPE: COMPETITION AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES | 41 
More importantly, one of the Commission’s priorities has been to condition capital injections to 
sustained lending to the real economy, in particular because it came as a counterpart to a lower 
capital remuneration rate (around 8%). Even though the methodologies put in place to fulfil that 
condition have been reviewed and approved by the Commission, the actual implementation 
thereof has been left to the member states, which explains again the diversity in the approaches 
adopted in the various national rescue schemes.  
In the UK (N 507/2008), the authorities committed to require banks to maintain the availability 
of lending to homeowners and small businesses at 2007 levels and to support schemes to 
prevent home foreclosures. In France (N 618/2008), beneficiaries of capital injections were 
bound by an obligation to increase loans to individuals, SMEs and local authorities by 3-4% 
annually. In Germany (N 512/2008), a general requirement was included in the bailout plan to 
the effect that beneficiaries ought to take account of domestic industry’s borrowing 
requirements (particularly SMEs).  
3.  Conditions aimed at preventing distortions of competition 
Generally, the main concern of the Commission has been to prevent state support to provide a 
competitive edge to banks in difficulty over their competitors. In that respect, one can 
distinguish between behavioural conditions on the one hand, which are generally imposed on 
the beneficiaries of bailout plans and (in theory) subject to close monitoring and structural 
conditions, on the other hand, which are tied to the restructuring of ailing or ‘distressed’ 
institutions.  
Behavioural conditions attached to bailout plans 
The Commission has systematically conditioned the benefit of bailout plans, whether in the 
form of guarantees and/or capital injections, to a series of behavioural conditions that have been 
applied in a relatively homogeneous manner across the European Union. One of the main 
reasons underlying the imposition thereof has been the massive inflows of deposits observed in 
the early days of the crisis towards banks benefiting from state backing. The ultimate example 
of such a phenomenon was Northern Rock, which in only a few weeks moved from the brink of 
bankruptcy after customers withdrew deposits massively to a much healthier situation after 
having been virtually nationalised. In some cases these behavioural conditions have had a 
significant impact on retail banking services.  
The most pervasive behavioural condition imposed on the beneficiaries of state support was a 
prohibition to communicate on and market that advantage to customers or to develop a 
commercial strategy on that basis.
69 At the peak of the crisis in October 2008, one could witness 
a tendency of certain institutions to claim such advantage to attract or at least slow the run of 
customers.
70 The Commission insisted that such behaviour be properly sanctioned but no formal 
finding of abuse appears to have been reported yet.  
Early on in the crisis, the Commission also systematically imposed growth ceilings on the 
beneficiaries of bailout plans, expressed in terms of GDP, market share, balance sheet or 
historical growth.
71  For example, in seeking the approval of their national rescue plan, the 
German authorities committed to ensure that the beneficiaries thereof would not exceed a 
                                                      
69 Banking Communication, ¶26 and various Commission decisions on national rescue plans.  
70 For example, ccompetitors of Fortis Bank and KBC in Belgium and of ABN AMRO in the Netherlands 
have complained that those banks introduced more aggressive offers after having benefited from capital 
injections by the Belgian, French, Dutch and/or Luxemburg authorities. 
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certain balance sheet growth rate (N 512/2008). Later on, the Commission abandoned that 
practice, acknowledging that it could form an obstacle for fundamentally sound banks to sustain 
lending to the economy and, generally, to compete for customers and increase output levels.
72 
However, the Commission continued imposing limitations on external growth on a case-by-case 
basis. For example, in the case of Commerzbank, it noted that: 
Commerzbank has recently acquired Dresdner Bank. However, Commerzbank will not 
be in a position to use state aid to the detriment of competitors. The bank will be 
restricted from acquiring other competing financial institutions for a period of three 
years.
73 
Likewise, in one of the decisions concerning Fortis Bank Belgium (NN 42/2008), the 
Commission imposed a commitment on the acquirer BNP Paribas “not to repurchase Fortis 
Netherland assets for a 4 years period”. In some cases, mainly those involving Dutch financial 
institutions (e.g., N 528/2008 and N 569/2008), one also encountered a sort of catch-all 
condition imposing on beneficiaries to “refrain from expansion of business activities that would 
not have been pursued absent the capital injection”. It is unclear how such a condition is 
supposed to operate in practice except that it may prompt complaints from competitors and 
therefore assist in policing the commercial conduct of the beneficiaries of sate support measures.  
A category of conditions impacting directly on the supply of retail banking services related to 
the remuneration of some of those services. Indeed, the Commission has imposed in some cases, 
reportedly at the request of complainants, a prohibition to undercut rivals either for specific 
services, in certain areas of business or even across the board. In the Fortis decision of 
December 3, 2008 (NN 42/2008), for example, the Commission referred to a “commitment not 
to offer for Internet accounts interest rates higher than the other main retail banking actors in 
Belgium”, with some limitations if, for example, Fortis’ market shares dropped below 25%. In 
the Dexia decision of November 2008 (NN 50/2008), the Commission referred to a 
“commitment not to offer interests rates for retail deposits higher than those of the three main 
attractive remunerations offered by the ten largest retail banks in each of Luxembourg, France 
and Belgium”, in addition to a limitation on the openings of preferred savings accounts. 
Likewise, in the press-release commenting on the Commerzbank decision,
74 the Commission 
emphasised that the bank “will be prevented from doing business (including deposit taking) 
under more favourable price conditions that its top three competitors in markets/products where 
it has a market share above 5%”.  
Finally, another relatively common condition provided for the obligation to keep high solvency 
ratios and, conversely, to avoid that capital injections be used to fuel growth and, generally, for 
other purposes than ensuring long-term stability.
75  
Structural conditions  
To ensure a level playing field and prevent the continuation of failed business models, the 
Commission has imposed structural conditions on distressed credit institutions, that is, for those 
that either had to draw on state guarantees or benefited from urgent recapitalisation measures. 
The conditions have taken the form of reductions in activities and/or outright divestitures of 
non-core or loss-making assets.  
                                                      
72 See in particular footnote 18 of the Recapitalisation Communication.  
73 Kroes, N., Opening remarks at press-conference – State aid decisions on Commerzbank, Hypo Real 
Estate and Northern Rock, Brussels, 7 May 2009 (SPEECH 09/217). 
74 Idem.  
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Reductions in activities entailed the discontinuation of businesses that were found to be at the 
root of the solvency issues encountered by the beneficiaries of state rescue measures. They 
involved, for example, the termination of proprietary trading activities,
76 or more institution-
specific measures. The following examples are illustrative of the kind and scope of such 
measures: (i) Sachsen LB had to undertake the closure of its Irish subsidiary involved in 
structured financial investments and international real estate business (C 9/2008); (ii) Northern 
Rock committed originally to the closure of many of its overseas operations, to a drastic 
reduction in its lending operations and to enter into a retail mortgage redemption programme 
(NN 70/2007); and (iii) Commerzbank pledged to a reduction in its investment banking 
operations (N 625/2008).  
As noted, the Commission also imposed compensatory measures for the benefit of state support 
in the form of outright divestitures. Unsurprisingly, the actual assets to be divested were not 
necessarily identified in the decisions conditioning the benefit of capital injections and other 
rescuing measures. For example, the Sachsen LB decision refers merely a “sale of assets” (C 
9/2008). In the Commerzbank case, though, after controversies as to the scope and nature of the 
requested divestitures, it was disclosed that the bank would divest its real estate activities 
(Eurohypo), as well as “other subsidiaries” (N 625/2008).  
Generally, in line with the requirements set forth in its guidelines on state aid for rescuing and 
restructuring firms in difficulty,
77  the Commission is entitled to require structural measures 
involving downsizing the balance sheet of the relevant credit institutions by 45-50%.  
4.  Concluding remarks: Conditionality in question 
The rules on state aid have enabled the Commission to become involved in the design of the 
various financial recovery plans and individual rescue measures adopted at national level and as 
a result to play an important role in the management of the financial crisis. In doing so, the 
Commission has pursued a combination of competition and regulatory objectives by 
conditioning the benefit of rescue measures to various requirements, which differ in nature and 
are addressed to different actors. Yet, while the design and implementation of impaired assets 
relief programmes is likely to be the most pressing task in the months ahead,
78 some of the 
policy choices recently acted upon by the Commission, in particular in relation to the imposition 
of structural conditions, deserve some questioning in at least two fundamental respects.  
First, aside from the strict policy principles guiding the treatment of state aid aimed to rescue 
and restructure firms in difficulty, one can question whether structural compensations are 
necessary or even desirable in a systemic crisis. First, in an interconnected financial system, 
banks actually benefit from the mere fact that their competitors get rescued. Second, in the 
current environment, it is inherently difficult to value the assets to be divested to attract 
purchasers and to secure the financing of large acquisitions. Third, one may wonder whether 
there is not a risk to actually worsen the crisis by forcing credit institutions to divest assets at 
depreciated value. Those concerns militate, at least, for exercising utmost care in ordering 
divestitures and significant flexibility in the implementation of such remedies.  
                                                      
76 See, e.g., Commission decisions on Sachsen LB (C 9/2008) and West LB (NN 25/2008). 
77 See note 10 above. The guidelines condition the benefit or restructuring aid to compensatory measures 
to avoid undue distortions of competition (divestitures, reductions in capacity, etc.) and a contribution by 
the beneficiary of up to 50% of the restructuring costs (by means of sales of assets, external financing, 
etc.).  
78 See Communication from the Commission of February 25, 2009 on the treatment of impaired assets in 
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Second, there appear to be clear tensions between the divestitures ordered or favoured by the 
Commission so far and the objective of promoting market integration, i.e., internal market 
policy. On one hand, it is unclear how the Commission can actually prevent taxpayers’ money 
from subsidising acquisitions. On the other hand, in an environment where member states have 
a natural tendency to protect their domestic economy, is it not paradoxical to induce banks to re-
focus on their ‘home market’, as the Commission appears to have done in the early cases 
involving the German Landesbanken?
79 However, the Commission appears to have favoured 
more consistent remedies in later cases, for example by refraining to mandate the divestiture of 
Commerzbank’s retail banking network in Central and Eastern Europe. Likewise, it seems to 
have favoured cross-border rescue mergers over purely domestic ones.
80  
The questions raised above do not aim to downplay the merits of the Commission’s action in 
managing a crisis that is unprecedented in many ways. However, even in the current 
circumstances, there certainly is an interest in preventing today’s solutions from becoming 
tomorrow’s problems.  
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